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How much fuel remained inside the Chornobyl Unit 4 after the accident?
What is the scale of radionuclide emission in the environment? Till now
these questions excite the scientific community of the world. The critical
analysis of various points of view on a problem of radionuclide emission
during the accident at Chornobyl NPP is proposed.
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One of the central scientific and political interests and activities of the aca-
demician, the member of Ukrainian Parliament I.R.Yukhnovskii are the problems
connected with Chornobyl accident. Under his supervision there were investigated:
conditions of nuclear fuel in the 4-th reactor [1–4] after the accident; physical and
chemical processes of interaction of fuel-containing masses with water and a prob-
lems of hydrogen and radiolysis [3,5–7]; processes of radionuclide migration [8,9]
in the site “Shelter” (“Sarcophagus”) and in aqueous solutions in the soil of the
Chornobyl zone. Many of his scientific conclusions have proved to be true concerning
the mechanisms of the destruction fuel–containing masses (FCM), an exit from them
and accumulation of uranium, plutonium in aqueous solutions of the site “Shelter”.
Actually there are suggestions to use aqueous solutions for radionuclide extraction
from the site “Shelter”.
In the proposed article we want deal with one of the main questions which excites
the public of the world till now. It is a question – how much nuclear fuel remained
inside the Chornobyl Unit 4 nuclear power plant (ChNPP) after the accident?
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After the accident at ChNPP in 1986, various experts (from different countries)
made estimations of the size of radionuclide emission, essentially differing in struc-
ture and in activity. So, according to an estimation [10] submitted to the meeting of
experts MAGATE in August, 1986, (total emission of fission products (FP) without
radionuclide noble gases (RNG)) has made emission 50 MCi, or ∼ 3,5% of total
radionuclides in the reactor at the moment of the accident. That is to say the total
radionuclide activity in the active zone at the moment of the accident was considered
to be ∼ 1500 MCi [11, 12]. One of the first hypothetical estimations of the emission
was made 02.05.86 [13], prior to the beginning of serious experimental research, “at
the extreme scarcity of the initial information”, the absence of data on radionuclide
activity in the reactor at the moment of the accident, based on such a selected model
according to which “from a reactor rather small part of fuel and FP” is thrown out
only. It was clear, that in that case the technique of the approach predetermined
the result. Not knowing about this model and the estimation of emission (made by
A.A.Hrulev taking place in Moscow), made simultaneously in Kiev the initial gen-
eral estimation of emission in the environment of fragmental elements has made up
∼ 80 % [14].
In Chornobyl in May, 1986 a group of experts from Minsredmash of the former
USSR accepted an estimation of emission for a limited territory around ChNPP
which made up 15–25 % fragmental nuclides and fuel [15], thus it was considered
that 65–75 % of the quantity of the fuel which occurred in the reactor at the moment
of the accident, according to calculations, there are in the territory limits around
ChNPP, probably, 10–30 % out of them are in the shaft of the reactor, 10–40 % are
in generator hall, 5 % – are in a blockage balloon of emergency shut-down system
(ESRS), about 25 % are in the territory around ChNPP [15]. The same estimation
of fuel emission, even stronger – 80 % of loading of the active zone, was accepted
by experts and it was marked later [16] that the emission of 3–5 % should be only
in case of partial fusion of heat-emitting elements, that corresponded to Hrulev’s
1986 [13] model, but the results of supervision did not convince of the validity of
the model and the estimation of emission appropriate to it.
It is possible to present a few dozens estimations of the emergency emission,
but it will not change (it will only confirm) the evidence of the fact: the uniform,
conventional, strictly proved estimation of the emission is not present yet.
However it does not exclude a critical look at the reasons of the origin of incon-
sistency of the estimations. Such an attempt of the critical analysis of the available
information according to real a size of emissions of radioactive substances and the
scale of environmental contamination as the result of Chornobyl accident in 1986 is
represented by A.Bolsunovsky’s work [17]. In it, the attention, first of all, paid to
the necessity of considering the full radionuclide list in the structure of emergency
emission (the account of the contribution of the short time life of radionuclides with
a half-life period from several hours up to several dozen days should enable us to es-
timate doze loading on the population in the first day and months after the accident
more objectively) was, in particular, inverted. Second, the existing distinctions in
estimations as total, and with division on nuclides emission in an environment, made
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by experts of various countries at different times were marked. Estimations differ
2–5 times for various nuclides. Third, it was underlined that there is a significant
disorder in estimations of the emission of fuel for the limits of the reactor. These
reasons have urged the author [17] to a conclusion about the necessity of revising
the official value of radionuclide emission aside from the increases.
Really, the results of the calculations of the total activity of the fission products
published before the accident at the end of the campaign RBMK-1000 gave the
size ∼ 10 GCi [18,19], and after the accident the estimations (the same authors)
appeared to be almost one order less, ∼ 1500 MCi [10,11]. This divergence can be
explained, for example, by the distinctions of the accounted set FP. It is obvious, that
a more careful analysis of the data is necessary to reduce the disorder of estimations
not only at the operating time FP, the difficulty also consists in the absence of
authentic experimental data about the laws of distribution of these radionuclides in
an environment.
As the majority of experts admit, that during the initial time a few weeks after
the accident, the greatest danger to the population presented 131I with a half-life
period ∼ 8 days. Some months after disintegration of iodine dominant there was a
radioactivity of barium, cerium, ruthenium and zirconium. Today the basic problem
consists in 137Cs, 90Sr (a half-life periods about 30 years), plutonium 239Pu (a half-life
periods 24116.5 years) and americium 241Am (a half-life periods 432.2 years).
The official Soviet figure of the total radionuclide emission makes up approxi-
mately 50 MCi and it was clearly marked that this figure does not include the activity
of noble gases, why it was corrected for May 6, 1986. If in this estimation activity
we include the short time life of nuclides it will increase a few times, approximately
up to 200 MCi, and the total activity up to 5–10 GCi and over [20,21].
As emission was distributed throughout the globe. In other countries, the nuclide
quantity thrown out in the atmosphere was measured as well. Proceeding from the
measured radionuclides concentration in the atmosphere and knowing a wind to rise,
using the appropriate computer programs, in several institutes the quantity of the
nuclides thrown out worldwide was counted.
The results of calculations of the French, English and American studies on ra-
dionuclide emission in the environment [22–23] show (table 1) that the Soviet,
English and American figures practically coincide, except for the emission 239Np,
(though the results of the American calculations essentially differ among them-
selves).
The official estimation of the emission of nuclear fuel for the limits of the reactor,
submitted in the MAGATE report in 1986, made up 3–4 % from the full loading the
reactor (190 t uranium), i.e. ∼ 6–8 t. The estimation of emission of fuel in 15–20 %
was rejected [24] as contradicting presentations about distribution of the fuel of the
4-th unit after the accident (up to 95 % of fuel is in the shaft of the reactor [25,26]).
In the reports of Complex Expedition IAE in 1990 the estimation of the weight
of fuel in “Shelter”: 135 ± 30 t (on uranium) in “lava–like” fuel-containing masses
(LFCM) and up to 35–50 t as dust and fragments of fuel in the central hall [27–29] is
given. Thus, the possible emission of fuel from the shaft of the reactor was implicitly
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Table 1. The estimation of radionuclide emission in the atmosphere as the result
of Chornobyl accident in 1986. Settlement estimations of emission, MCi
Nuclide USSR France England USA
1 2 3
90Sr 0.126 0.216 0.034 0.18
103Ru 3.21 1.65 3.24 0.81 0.72 3
106Ru 1.57 0.84 1.59 0.14 0.17 0.91
131I 7.3(13)∗ 7.29 45.9 36 7
132Te 1.29 0.62 1.3 9.99 5.3 2
133Xe 45.9 45.1 175.5 120 45
137Cs 1.0(2)∗ 1.54 0.999 2.4 2.4 0.81
144Ce 2.42 0.021 2.4 0.14 0.14 2.5
239Np 0.113 1.188 3
∗ In brackets the later published estimations of the Soviet experts are submitted.
appreciated up to 75 t (∼ 39,5%). In 1992 the estimation of the quantity of fuel in
LFCM have got even a greater disorder up to 40 % [30] that corresponded to the
weight of uranium in LFCM from 81 up to 189 t, supposing the size of emission
from 0 up to 43%.
In the text of the Memorandum of the international symposium of 1994 “Safety
of Shelter–94” it is mentioned that the quantity of nuclear fuel inside the 4-th unit
is estimated in the interval from 27 up to 135 t [31]. Thus, the worst estimation of
the quantity of the thrown out fuel can make up 163 t, or ∼ 86 %. The results of the
research executed by NIKIET and RSTC KI employees [32], show that in the found
out congestions LFCM inside the site “Shelter” there is revealed approximately 10–
15 % of fuel from the initial loading of the reactor. Thus, to speak about authentically
established size of the emission of nuclear fuel from a reactor during the accident
there is no real experimental basis. The balance of nuclear fuel 4 units ChNPP inside
and outside the site “Shelter” is not shown till now [33,34], and this conclusion for
a long time became the property of the international scientific community.
The report of the English experts [22] prepared in 1987, contains (regarding ra-
dioactive emission) the comparative data according to the radionuclide contents in
the fuel at the moment of the accident, submitted by Soviet Union in MAGATE in
1986 and calculated with the computer code FISPIN. The basic attention of the En-
glish experts was inverted to the most important forecast of radiating consequences
of radionuclide accident. The results of the analysis testify that the estimation of
the contents in nuclide fuel cesium (134Cs, 136Cs, 137Cs), ruthenium – 106Ru a little
and neptunium – 239Np, received by the Soviet experts, misses in comparison with
the results of the English experts, and the estimations of the contents in the fuel of
the other radionuclides are in good consent. The English experts criticize the official
value of the total radionuclide emission on the first day of the accident (15 MCi),
including a settlement mistake, and, correcting a mistake of the Soviet experts, the
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Table 2. The contents in a reactor, MCi
Nuclide USSR France German Sweden England USA
1 2 1 2 3
90Sr 5.4 2.2 6.2 0.3 5.1 3.8 4.6
103Ru 133 97.2 129.6 37.8 104 118 111 140
106Ru 54 13 34.2 118 25 25 32
131I 85 62.1 67.4 27 72 80 84 81 82
132Te 90 67.5 57 37.8 107 111 119 111
133Xe 196 140 178 170 168
137Cs 7.8 2.5 8.3 1.4 3.9 6.5 4.6 6.2
144Ce 86 59 114 77 105 84 93
239Np 86 567 570 513 1372 1276 1647 180
239Pu 0.023 0.0017 0.0244 0.02 0.02 0.26
resulting size of emission in 40 MCi.
In all cases the initial information on the emergency source of radionuclide emis-
sion is the estimation of radionuclide quantity in the reactor at the moment of the
accident. The results of calculations of the contents of some important radionuclides
in the fuel of the reactor 4 blocks Chornobyl APP for the April 26, 1986, executed
by experts of different countries [22–23,35] are given in tables 2 and 3.
The data submitted in table 2, testify, that the disorder of the results for the
same nuclides can reach several times, and for 239Np and 239Pu even orders. The
disorder of settlement estimations of the radionuclide contents in a reactor is one
of the reasons of the disorder of estimations of emergency radionuclide emission.
A.Sich’s thesis [23] is based on experimental data and estimations received by him
from some employees of Complex Expedition I.V.Kurchatov’s IAE in Chornobyl,
the conclusions made in the work, apparently, in a greater degree reflect the opinion
of these employees.
Significant differences of settlement estimations of the radionuclide contents in
the fuel (according to the official data given 1986) from other estimations are ob-
served for 106Ru – is overestimated ∼ 2 times, 239Np – is underestimated ∼ 20 times
(in comparison with the Begichev’s estimations (1990) [35] and Sich’s (1993) [23]).
Estimations of a relative radionuclide exit in an environment (given in [23] in table
VI.6 (report MAGATE, 1986) and in table VI.7 (estimations of experts of England,
France, Canada, Livermor laboratories of USA, NRC USA)) which are systematized
in table 4, in the most part are comparable.
Apparently, from table 4, the maximal estimations (exceeding the average on an
exit of iodine 3–5 times and on an exit of strontium on 1–2 order), are given by the
Canadian experts. Clearly, that calculation of exit FP in a strongly depends on the
accepted model of the development of the processes of the accident and the thermal
parameters appropriate to it, in particular.
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Table 3. The contents in a reactor, MCi
Nuclide USSR MAGATE Kirchner Borovoj Begichev Sich
1986(1991) 1986 (1987) 1988 1989 1990 1993
90Sr 6.0 5.4 6.2 6.0 6.158 6.16
103Ru 130 130 130 102
106Ru 60 54 34 23.2 23.2
131I 86 85 67 83.2
132Te 73 90 57 121
133Xe 170 200 176
137Cs 7.7 7.8 8.2 7.0 7.02 7.01
144Ce 90 86 110 106 106
239Np 720 98 570 1567 1570
239Pu 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.026 0.02562 0.0256
Table 4. The estimation of exit radionuclides at the accident on 4 block Chernobyl
APP.
Elements USSR England France Canada USA
LLNL NRC
RNG 100.0 much – – 50–100 100
I 20.0 15–20 – 75 12–60 131I 20
Cs 13.0 15–20 20 16 14–86 137Cs 20
Te 15.0 little 7 – – 3
Ru 2.9 1 1–2 – – 0.3–0.4
Sr 4.0 little – 16 0/01–1 90Sr –
Ba 5.6 little – – – 0.4–0.7
La – little 0.01–0.04 – – 0.06–0.2
Np 3.2 little 0.02–0.04 – – 0.04–0.1
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Based on the presentations about gradual heat-up fuel and fusion of a part of
the active zone (in essence, Hrulev’s model). A.Sich draws the conclusions which
are distinct from estimations of Hrulev’s: the exit 137Cs has made up 35 % from
the contained in the reactor at the moment of the accident (the first official figure –
13 %, later of 26 %) and the total exit of radioactive substances in the environment
(excepting noble gases) has made size 4–5 times bigger than it is given in MAGATE
report in 1986 (50 MCi), i.e. 200–250 MCi.
Really, in May, 1986 calculations [36] according to which one month after the
accident from the nuclear fuel of the 4-th unit should “leave” (or depart) a minimum
of 80 % Cs – a maximum of 100 % Cs were executed. Nevertheless, there was claimed
an exit 137Cs all over again ∼ 13 %, then in an interval of 20–40 %, and a total
radionuclide exit (without RBG) with the account for the short time life of isotopes
∼ 200–250 MCi, i.e. estimations of emergency emission, basically, are the expert, at
the best, supported calculations, which demand a more strict substantiation.
A special place is occupied by the estimations of plutonium emission. The results
of experimental research GEOCHIM in May–June 1986 were characterized by some
experts as erroneous [24]. However, actually, their authors’ estimation was confirmed
and later [37,38] and if these estimations are true, emission FP only in the territory
investigated by them can be up to ∼ 8 %, and we can see they are fixed in all
countries of northern hemisphere [38].
Thus, the comparative analysis of radioactive emission as the result of the acci-
dent, allows us to draw the following conclusions:
1. The final estimation of radionuclide emission during the accident, according to
various authors, is not verified and not measured. They are only variants of expert
estimations.
2. Distinctions in estimations of radionuclide quantity in the reactor at the mo-
ment of the accident should explain methodical errors in settlement programs and
the inconsistency of the initial data.
3. In the estimations of the size of emission in an environment (where it does
not concern simple mistakes) it is possible to explain the distinctions aprioristic
uncertainty and not the account for many physical and chemical processes at a
heavy accident in conditions of the atomic power station with RBMK.
4. The estimation of the quantity of the thrown out fuel in many respects can
be explained during the further works on the site “Shelter”.
5. Revision of the official data on the size of radionuclide emission as the result of
Chornobyl accident, undoubtedly, is necessary. However more objective data than in
MAGATE report in 1986, the information should generalize, within the framework
of the international cooperation, the saved up experience of experimental and set-
tlement research of the behaviour and the interaction of fuel, radionuclides, building
designs, graphite, water etc. during heavy accidents. Now it is presented real.
One of us (M.T.) thanks the INTAS (Project INTAS-Ukraine 95–0133) for fi-
nancial support.
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Отримано 7 липня 2000
Скільки палива залишилось всередині 4 блоку ЧАЕС після аварії?
Який масштаб викиду радіонуклідів в оточуюче середовище? Такі пи-
тання й досі хвилюють наукову спільноту всього світу. Пропонується
критичний аналіз різних точок зору на проблему викиду радіонуклідів
у процесі аварії на Чорнобильській АЕС.
Ключові слова: Чорнобильська АЕС, викид радіонуклідів,
паливомісні маси, уран, плутоній
PACS: 05.60.+w, 28.20.Gd, 66.20.+d
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